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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MYRON BROUGH, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
RAMON R. APPAWORA, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 
14434 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
* * * * * * * 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant-Appellant does not believe that Plaintiff-
Respondent has addressed the issues raised in defendant's main 
brief. Plaintiff asserts new facts and arguments for the first 
time on appeal, never having raised the issues in the trial court 
proceedings. 
In keeping with the requirement of Rule 75(p)(2), para-
graph 3, defendant Appawora will endeavor to limit this reply to 
new matter set forth in plaintiff's brief. 
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I. 
The Record Fully Supports Defendant-
Appellant's Position In This Appeal 
A. Service of Process 
Plaintiff's Statement of Facts notes that the original 
Summons had stamped upon it a purported "Authorization to serve 
papers on U. and 0. Reservations (Uintah and Ouray),***." Several 
facts are implicit in that notation. 
First, apparently the Uintah County Deputy Sheriff 
correctly recognized that his authority did not extend within 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation for purposes of serving an enrolled 
Ute Indian residing thereon with process issued by a state court. 
He therefore sought some form of Ute Tribal authorization. 
Second, it is also implicit that the continued existence 
of the Reservation as a reservation is recognized by the Ute Tribe 
and its Tribal Court Judges. 
Third, absent compliance with the statutory procedures, 
both State and Federal, developed under Point III in appellant's 
initial brief, not even the Tribal Business Committee, let alone 
a judge of the Tribal Court, could authorize efficacious service 
of state process on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation or otherwise 
confer jurisdiction over defendant on a State District Court. This 
is precisely the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 440 U.S. 423, 27 L.Ed. 2d 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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507, 91 S.Ct. 480 (1971) developed at pages 14-15 of defendant's 
initial brief. 
B. Status of the Situs of the Accident 
Plaintiff-respondentfs brief takes issue with the charac-
terization of the location of the accident in question as a highway 
"right-of-way," contending rather that "Uintah County now owns the 
road." (Plaintiff's brief, pages 3-4). Defendant-appellant submits 
that this distinction, even if true, makes absolutely no difference 
for purposes of determining jurisdiction. 
As developed at Point I of defendant's initial brief, 
the term "Indian country", for purposes of both civil and criminal 
jurisdiction includes 
all lands within the limits of any 
Indian Reservation under jurisdiction 
of the United States Government, not-
withstanding the issuance of any patent, 
and, including rights-of-way running 
through the reservation,***. 
(18 U.S.C. Section 1151). 
Clearly, then, whether the road in question is held in fee by the 
county or is merely a right-of-way granted by the Tribe, the result 
is the same — it is "Indian country" and part of the reservation 
in either case for purposes of determining jurisdiction. 
C. Status of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation Boundaries 
(1) Procedural Considerations 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff-respondent makes the assertion that the record 
does not support the fact that the Uintah and Ouray Reservation 
exists as a continuing Indian reservation with an exterior bound-
ary. Plaintiff-respondent in making this assertion has misread 
the record and ignored the evidence presented to the lower court. 
The reservation boundary was never questioned by plaintiff-respon-
dent before the District Court below and is asserted on this 
appeal for the first time. Plaintiff's reference in his Reply 
to the District Court dated November 10, 1975, to the case now 
pending between the Ute Tribe and the State of Utah and certain 
of its political subdivisions did not refer to the issue of reser-
vation status (See R. 28); therefore, no judicial notice was ever 
given. 
It is an established rule of appellate review that 
issues of defense or grounds of opposition may not be raised for 
the first time on appeal. See £.£. Dallof v. Robinson, 520 P.2d 
191 (Utah 1974) and W.W. and W.B. Gardner v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 
264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970). 
Further, the only evidence before the District Court 
was to the effect that the situs of the accident is "located 
entirely within the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation" (R. 20). This statement was contained in an affidavit 
submitted in support of defendant's Motion to Dismiss and was 
made by the Superintendent of the Uintah and Ouray Agency of the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, located 
at Fort Duchesne, Utah. Plaintiff has never, by counter affidavit, 
motion to strike, or otherwise, presented any evidence to rebut 
this fact. 
Finally, the Ute Indian Tribe, the United States as 
trustee for said Tribe, and perhaps the State of Utah are indis-
pensable parties to any action in which the issue of the existence 
of the Ute Tribe's reservation is seriously questioned. As deve-
loped below, this court may properly take judicial notice that 
the issue has been decided in favor of the existence of the 
reservation in a recent decision in the Utah Federal District 
Court between the Ute Tribe and the Utah State Tax Commission. 
See The Ute Indian Tribe v. State Tax Commission of the State 
of Utah, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, No. C-
74-183. 
(2) Substantive Considerations 
Assuming, arguendo, that the issue of the status of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation has been adequately raised by plaintiff, 
defendant submits that the Reservation has not been disestablished 
and that the burden of proving such disestablishment would be 
upon plaintiff who did not in the District Court, and has not now, 
met that burden. Plaintiff's brief has cited only a small fraction 
of the relevant statutory materials which necessarily have to be 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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considered by a federal court in ruling on the issue of the status 
of a federally recognized Indian Reservation. 
Defendant, an individual Ute Indian, has appeared spe-
cially herein to contest what he feels is an unwarranted and improper 
attempt to extend state court jurisdiction to him while he is on 
his reservation. Defendant's Tribe does not appear herein as a 
party, and defendant will not endeavor to present to this Court in 
this brief the voluminous evidence which substantiates the 
continued existence of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, upon 
which defendant lives and upon which the accident in question 
occurred. Defendant will present herein the most obvious of 
such evidence to rebut the weak attempt plaintiff has made to 
draw the question into issue for the first time on this appeal. 
A very recent decision of the U.S. Federal District 
Court for the District of Utah provides the most recent reaffir-
mation of the continuing existence of the Uintah and Ouray Reser-
vation. The Ute Indian Tribe brought suit against the Utah State 
Tax Commission to restrain collection of Utah State Sales Taxes 
in Indian transactions on the reservation in the case of The Ute 
Indian Tribe v. State Tax Commission of the State of Utah, No. C-
74-183 in the Utah Federal District Court. Following a trial of 
the issues raised therein, the Court entered its "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order" dated February 25, 1976. The 
relevant finding and conclusion to the issue of reservation status 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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are quoted as follows: 
The Uintah and Ouray Reservation was 
created and exists and its boundaries 
established under and pursuant to Execu-
tive Orders of October 3, 1861 and January 
5, 1882 and Acts of Congress of May 5, 
1864, (13 Stat. 63) and March 11, 1948 
(62 Stat. 72) and the laws of the United 
States. (Finding of Fact number 5). 
The area within the exterior boundaries 
of plaintiff's Reservation is Indian country, 
notwithstanding the existence of patented 
or fee lands within said boundaries, and 
as the plaintiff has not consented to the 
jurisdiction of the defendant by agreement 
or otherwise and as there has been no en-
actment by Congress providing that Utah 
State law shall apply to the sales within 
the Reservation, the defendant has no juris-
diction within the exterior boundaries 
of the Reservation to tax Indians or Indian 
property. (Conclusion of Law number 5). 
The Order entered by the Court restrained the State Tax Commission, 
inter alia, from collecting state sales taxes on sales by or to 
Indians on the Reservation. 
It has long been established that once a reservation 
is established "all tracts included within it remain a part of the 
reservation until separated therefrom by Congress" (U.S. v. Celestine, 
215 U.S. 278, 285, 54 L.Ed. 195,30 S.Ct. 93 (1909)). The Supreme 
Court has expressly rejected the notion that opening up of an 
Indian reservation to non-Indian settlers under the homestead 
laws effects a disestablishment of the reservation, nor does it 
separate the lands therein, even if patented to non-Indians, from 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the reservation. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 
7 L.Ed. 2d 346, 82 S.Ct. 424 (1962). (See also the definition 
of "Indian country" in 18 U.S.C. Section 1151 — includes fee 
patented lands within reservations). 
The same conclusion was reached in the case of Mattz v. 
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505, 37 L.Ed. 2d 92, 93 S.Ct. 2245 (1973) in 
which the following rule is announced regarding acts of Congress 
claimed to disestablish an Indian reservation: 
A congressional determination to terminate 
must be expressed on the face of the Act 
or be clear from the surrounding circum-
stances and legislative history. 
Both of these cases expressly hold that neither the making of 
allotments to the Indians, nor the opening of the reservation to 
non-Indian settlers, nor both factors together, are sufficient 
to warrant the conclusion that a reservation has been disestab-
lished. Indeed the Mattz decision quotes favorably from an opinion 
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that, 
a holding favoring federal jurisdiction 
is required unless Congress has expressly 
or by clear implication diminished the 
boundaries of the reservation opened to 
settlement. (Emphasis the court's). 
412 U.S. at 505, footnote 23, quoting 
from U.S. ex rel Condon v. Erickson 
478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973). 
The Supreme Court's most recent disestablishment issue 
case does indeed find that disestablishment had occurred. See 
De Coteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 43 L.Ed. 2d 
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300, 95 S.Ct. 1082 (1975). In that case the Supreme Court found 
that the requisite congressional intent to disestablish existed as 
a result of the Indians expressly intending to give up their 
land and signing a contract to the effect that they did "cede, 
sell, relinquish, and convey all of their interest in the reser-
vation" to the United States. The Act of Congress ratifying this 
agreement with the Indians involved likewise expressly recognized 
that by the agreement, the Indians had "ceded, sold, relinquished 
and conveyed to the United States" all of their interest in their 
reservation. Contrasting this language with the language contained 
in the Acts plaintiff has cited reveals no express or clearly implied 
intent by either the Ute Tribe or by Congress to disestablish the 
Ute's reservation upon opening it to non-Indian settlement. Indeed, 
the most recent Congressional pronouncement on the status of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation is found in the Act of March 11, 
1948 (62 Stat. 72) which expressly recognizes that the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation is a reservation having an exterior bound-
ary as defendant has asserted herein. This Act begins as follows: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the 
exterior boundary of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation in Grand and Uintah Counties, 
in the State of Utah, for the benefit of 
the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and 
Ouray Reservation, is hereby extended to 
include the following area: 
*** 
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If the reservation was disestablished in 1902 as plaintiff-respondent 
contends, then how could Congress add to or extend the "exterior 
boundary" in 1948? 
Defendant contends: (1) that the issue of whether or not 
the Uintah and Ouray Reservation has been disestablished is not 
properly before this Court on review as plaintiff has failed to 
raise the issue below; (2) that the only evidence in the record 
of this case on the issue of reservation status is the affidavit 
of the B.I.A. Superintendent of the Reservation that the accident in 
question took place at a location which is entirely within the 
Reservation; (3) that if the issue of reservation status is properly 
before this Court, the issue must be decided as it was in the Seymour 
and Mattz cases, against reservation disestablishment, based solely 
on the making of allotments and opening of a reservation to settle-
ment by non-Indians; (4) that plaintiff's attempts to distinguish 
these cases and to tie the present case to the De Coteau situation 
on the basis of payment of compensation to the Indians is meaningless 
since compensation was also paid or credited to the account of the 
Indians involved in the Seymour and Mattz cases; and (5) that in any 
event, plaintiff has failed to address, let alone meet, his burden 
of proving reservation disestablishment in light of the Congressional 
action in 1948, even assuming this were the proper forum to decide 
this important federal issue. 
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D. Plaintiff Has Confused Defendant's Rights 
And Interests With Those of the Ute Tribe 
Plaintiff, in the conclusion to his brief, makes the 
completely unwarranted conclusion that he "believes the 
tribe to be the real party in interest," Plaintiff likewise 
in his brief has attempted to tie defendant to certain aat:> .-mrs 
which the Ute Tribe has and is prosecuting in both state and 
federal courts (See plaintiff's brief pages 4 and 9)• 
It must ilot be forgotten that plaintiff has obtained a 
purported judgment in excess of $28,000.00 against defendant, an 
individual member of the Ute Tribe. Defendant's interest herein 
is clear. Defendant is no more a party to litigation prosecuted 
in the name of the Tribe than is a citizen of the United States 
1 < litigation prosecuted by the United Stai.er>, no:. :i: i U-. ) averse 
true. 
Further, the action filed by the Ute Tribe in Federal 
court does not, as plaintiff has asserted (Plaintiff's brief p. 4), 
reveal that the Tribe is attempting to assume jurisdiction over 
all civil and criminal matters arisino riD•.>. r> t-v.*.- Tribo'r:. reser-
vation. Rather, as revealed by Section 1- ;"'*• !3 of the Ute Tribe's 
Law and Order Code, 
*** the Courts of the Ute Indian Tribe 
shall not assume jurisdiction over any 
civil or criminal matter which does not 
involve either the Tribe, its officers, 
agents, employees, property or enter-
prises- or a member of the Tribe, or a 
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member of federally recognized tribe, 
if some other forum exists for handling 
of the matter and if the matter is not 
one in which the rights of the Tribe or 
its members may be directly or indirectly 
affected. 
Clearly, the Tribe has expressly disclaimed exercising juris-
diction over the majority of actions which would arise within the 
Reservation boundaries, namely those involving only non-Indians 
and their property. Jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims against 
defendant would lie under this provision. Plaintiff's attempts 
to dramatize by exaggeration are no substitute for the legal 
substance which his position lacks. 
By referring to the case of "Ute Tribe etc. v. 
Hall Inc." (Plaintiff's brief p. 4), plaintiff has confused the 
rights of an individual Indian defendant to be subject only to 
tribal court jurisdiction for actions arising on the reservation, 
with the right of the Ute Tribe as an entity to seek affirmative 
relief in State Court when the circumstances so require. Whether 
or not the Tribe would have been liable for a counterclaim in 
that action was not before the District Court below and is 
certainly not before this Court on this appeal. 
It is well established that the relationship between 
the Indian people and the Federal government has been character-
ized as resembling that of a guardian to his ward. The federal 
government, and particularly the Congress in which resides plenary 
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power over Indian Affairs (see Point 1'S in defendant's initial 
brief), have traditionally exercised paternalistic supervision 
over most aspects fi !• j.i\\f. < ' this country's Indian citizens. 
This supervision has served a useful purpose to protect the 
Indians from unscrupulous outsiders who would take advantage 
of the Indians and their properties for personal gain, but 
has as a result, also left the Indian people generally unsoph-
isticated as to the non-Indian governmental and judicial processes. 
This is particularly true of the Indians who, like defendant 
herein, have chosen to remain on their reservations. 
In recognition of these facts, the Federal Government 
has jealously protected the right of Indian tribes to exercise 
their inherent tribal sovereignty on their reservations by 
strengthening tribal governments and by supporting the jurisdic-
tion of tribal courts over reservation based matters involving 
r e s e r v a t i o n laa.l an.c., e v e " ^ See ahoac Matt*..} «J aire leveV./e > >n-
I n d i a n s . See e.g. W i l l i a m s v. Le e , 358 U . S . ?.1V . :• j,.M. 2d 
2 5 ] ; 79 S, C t. ?(• CJ ("i y [»("''• : Uniix-d States v. _ Maz a r i e , 419 U.S. r> h*\ , 
***' -e-^ e. • . : * 7'-0 Mf;7r>). These federal policies 
recognize that, except .«.u cases also within the jurxadiciai ^e 
of the Federal courts, vho only approver :! ai * forp; \,h : .; 1. <<,e- ne^e 
the special needs of the reservation Indian while at the same 
time providing procedural and substantive fairness for the i.-on-
Indi c II I (as requ i red by 2 5 t J S C Se cti oi \ 3 3 0 2 (8) ) . 11, e i: i :i Da, 
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court on the Indian's reservation. Plaintiff has presented no 
argument to counteract the overwhelming weight of legal authority 
and established policy considerations which would justify this 
Court in overruling these precedents by affirming the trial court's 
unjustified assumption of jurisdiction over this action. See 
£.£. Williams v. Lee, supra; United State v. Mazurie, supra, 
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 36 L.Ed. 2d 
129, 93 S.Ct. 1257 (1973), Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 
423, 27 L.Ed. 2d 507, 91 S.Ct. 480 (1971). See also The Indian 
Reorganization Act (25 U.S.C. Section 461 et. seq.) ; The Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 (25 U.S.C. 
Section 450 et. seq.) ; Presidental Message to Congress on the 
American Indians dated July 8, 1970 (116 Cong. Rec. 114, H.6438 
et seq.); Congressional Resolution on National Indian Policy 
(S.Con.Res. 37, May 29, 1974; 120 Cong. Rec. 75, S. 9095). 
II. 
Defendant Has Not Made A General Appearance Herein 
Or Otherwise Conferred Jurisdiction On The State Courts. 
The first sentence of plaintiff's Part II regarding 
authorization of an Indian Judge to serve defendant with process 
has been dealt with under IA above. The second and concluding 
sentence under this Point claims that defendant has made a general 
appearance by attacking the District Court's jurisdiction. 
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Defendant would call the courtfs attention to the following 
factors in response to this contention. First, defendant has 
appeared specially herein solely to test the jurisdiction of the 
trial court and has expressly not made a general appearance (R. 8). 
Second, since defendant's motion herein was not made until after 
entry of the default judgment, it could not, in any event, serve 
to supply jurisdiction for entry of the default judgment occurring 
before the motion was made. Personal jurisdiction must exist at 
the time the judgment is entered, it cannot be supplied nunc pro 
tunc. Third, defendant asserts not only the lack of personal 
jurisdiction but the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See 
R-8; 11-16). Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be stipulated 
to or voluntarily or involuntarily conferred where not otherwise 
present. 
The decision i>:. tho Supreme four; of Nor-i h Dakota i n the 
case of Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (H« Dat 3 97LS), is instruc-
tive on this last point. Iii. this case, an enrolled reservation 
Indian was sued ioi ] ;f;,; •} ;i j ty arising from an automobile accident 
occurring on her reservation. The Indian signed a "Consent to 
Civil Jurisdiction" in which she consented ":•. mai/tcrr; -; • • -P'O 
civi1 jurisdiction of the state courts of North Dakota. A default 
judgment was obtained against her and an attempt was made to 
colJ'*<- J-v^  judgement from the state's Uns< itisfied J udgment Fund. 
Counsel for thai Fund moved to dismiss the action on the ground that 
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the state courts had no jurisdiction over the action against the 
Indian, regardless of her consent. The North Dakota Supreme Court 
agreed and ruled that the state courts did not have jurisdiction, 
despite the Indian's consent, absent compliance with 25 U.S.C. 
Section 1321 et seq. 
We now conclude that state jurisdiction over 
Indian country may be obtained only by state 
and tribal compliance with Public Law 90-284, 
Sections 402 and 406 (25 U.S.C. Section 1322 
and 1326). An individual defendant is no 
more able to confer jurisdiction upon the 
state than is a tribal council or a state, 
acting unilaterally. 232 N.W.2d at 57. 
See also Wisconsin Potawatomies, etc. v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. 719 
at 733 (W.D. Mich. 1973) . 
This holding is in accord with the established rule that 
subject matter jurisdiction, if otherwise lacking, cannot be conferred 
on a court by consent, estoppel or waiver. See £.£. McCain v. State 
Tax Commission, 360 P.2d 778, 782 (Or. 1961): 
(T)he contention of the plaintiff that 
the defendant waived the objection by 
making a general appearance is without 
merit. The question is not of juris-
diction of the person, but of the cause, 
and this cannot be conferred by consent. 
Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
to the same effect: 
(W)henever it appears by suggestion of 
the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, 
the court shall dismiss the action. 
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Conclusion 
Plaintiff-respondent has failed in his brief to address 
the substantial issues of State and Federal law raised by appellant 
herein. He has, instead, sought refuge in allegations not developed 
in or supported by the record. 
The simple relevant facts remain undiminished: that the 
District Court has improperly assumed jurisdiction to grant a 
substantial money judgment by default against defendant, an 
enrolled Ute Indian residing on the Uintah and Ouray Indian 
Reservation, for an automobile accident occurring within that 
same reservation. This action is contrary to both Utah State and 
Federal statutory law and the overwhelming weight of judicial 
decision in the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower Federal courts, and 
the various state supreme courts, all as developed in this and 
appellant's initial brief. 
The judgment entered below is void and this Court should 
should so declare and order the dismissal of this action and allow 
plaintiff io pursue his remedy in the only appropriate forum, the 
Tribal Court of the Ute Indian Tribe. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 25 day of May, 1 976, 
•. .' BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMMFv / !;OV-';\U:0 
Scott C. Pugsl( 
Attorney for Defendaryt-
Appellant 
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